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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES-UNION TRESPASS-
ING-EMPLOYER PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS-The United States
Supreme Court has held that an employer who refuses admittance
to his property to nonemployee union organizers has not commit-
ted an unfair labor practice if alternative means of communicating
to the employees are available to the union.
Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, US , 112 S Ct 841 (1992).
Local 919 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union
(hereinafter "the Union") filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB" or "the
Board") against Lechmere, Inc. for barring nonemployee union or-
ganizers from its parking lot.'
The Union, seeking to organize employees at a Newington, Con-
necticut, retail store owned and operated by Lechmere, Inc., began
its organizational drive by taking out a full-page advertisement in
the local newspaper.2 Being dissatisfied with the response to the
advertisement, the Union began placing handbills on the wind-
shields of cars parked in a lot utilized mainly by Lechmere em-
ployees. 3 Lechmere management, pursuant to store policy, asked
them to leave and subsequently removed the handbills.4 After be-
ing asked to leave the premises on several other occasions, the
union organizers began distributing the handbills5 from a grassy
1. Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, US , 112 S Ct 841, 844 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id. The parking lot was jointly owned by Lechmere and the developer of the
other smaller shops in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza. Id.
4. Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 914 F2d 313, 315-16 (1st Cir 1990). Lechmere's policy
forbade the solicitation and distribution of literature by nonemployees on company prop-
erty. This policy was posted on each door to the store and was routinely enforced against all
groups. Id.
5. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 844. The handbills were distributed before the store's
opening and after its closing to drivers entering and leaving the parking lot (presumably
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public strip of land between the parking lot and a four-lane high-
way. There they picketed daily for one month, followed by occa-
sional picketing for the next six months.7 Also during this time, the
organizers recorded the license plate numbers of cars parked in the
employee parking area.8 With the assistance of the Connecticut
Department of Motor Vehicles, they obtained the names and ad-
dresses of many Lechmere employees who were then contacted via
mail, phone or home visits.9 However, the Union was ultimately
unsuccessful in generating organization and filed the present
charges.1
The Administrative Law Judge ruled in the Union's favor and
recommended that Lechmere be ordered to stop barring the or-
ganizers from the parking lot and to post signs in conspicuous
places stating that policy.11 The Board affirmed and so ordered.
12
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied
Lechmere's petition for review and enforced the Board's order."3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 5 began his analysis of
employee organizational rights versus employer property rights by
referring to the applicable sections of the National Labor Relations
Act.' 6 Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees, inter alia, "the right
to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations."' 7
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with or restrain employees in the exercise of
employees). Id.
6. Id. The first time, Lechmere management informed the organizers that they were
on Lechmere property and ordered them to leave. When they refused, the general manager
called the police who confirmed that the grassy strip was public land. Lechmere, Inc., 914
F2d at 316.
7. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 844.
8. Id.
9. Id. The license number scheme resulted in the collection of names and addresses
of about twenty percent of the store's non-management employees. Id.
10. Id. The contacts to employees resulted in only one signed union authorization
card. Id. Such cards authorize the union to represent the employee in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit. Central Hardware Co. v NLRB, 407 US 539, 541 (1972).
11. 295 NLRB No 15, ALJ slip op (1988).
12. 295 NLRB No 15, Board slip op (1988).
13. Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 914 F2d 313 (1st Cir 1990).
14. 449 US , 111 S Ct 1305 (1991).
15. Joining Justice Thomas in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Souter. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in
which he was joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting
opinion.
16. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 845.
17. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 157 (1947).
Vol. 31:195196
1992 Recent Decisions 197
such rights. 8
Section 7 confers rights on employees only, not on unions or
nonemployee union organizers.19 However, the Court recognized in
NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co. 20 that the right of self-organization
depends somewhat on the ability of employees to learn the advan-
tages of self-organization from others.2 1 In Babcock, the Court
noted that employees have an unrestricted right to discuss organi-
zation among themselves 22 but, as a general rule, nonemployees
have no such right to use an employer's property for organizational
purposes. 23 The very narrow exception to this rule is that employ-
ers may be compelled to allow nonemployee organizers on their
property when employees are otherwise inaccessible to receiving
the Union's message.2 " Before turning to the issue of whether the
facts in Lechmere fit into this narrow exception, the Court consid-
ered and rejected the NLRB's Jean Country three-part test for de-
termining when employers' property rights must yield to employ-
18. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 158(a)(1) (1947).
19. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 845.
20. 351 US 105 (1956).
21. Babcock, 351 US at 113.
22. Id. The right which employees hold to discuss self-organization among themselves
is absolute unless the employer can show that restrictions are necessary to maintain produc-
tion or discipline. Republic Aviation Corp. v NLRB, 324 US 793 (1945).
In such cases the interests of employees in receiving organizational information must be
weighed against the employer's interest in controlling the use of his property. Babcock, 351
US at 109-10.
23. Babcock, 351 US at 112. In Babcock, the union was denied access to distribute
literature in a manufacturing plant's parking lot. Id at 106. The NLRB held that although
other means of communication were available, the union would have to be accommodated
because such other means were either dangerous (a public right-of-way adjoining the high-
way) or ineffective (mail, home visits and telephone calls). Babcock & Wilcox Co, 109 NLRB
485, 493-94 (1954). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, refused to enforce
the Board's order that the company permit the union on its property, NLRB v Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 222 F2d 316 (5th Cir 1955), and the Supreme Court affirmed, criticizing the
Board for failing to distinguish between employee and nonemployee rights to organize. Bab-
cock, 351 US at 113.
24. Babcock, 351 US at 112. Inaccessibility, as explained in Babcock, is where "the
location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the
reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them." Id at 113.
Inaccessibility has only been found in rare situations such as where mining employees
lived and worked at a remote and isolated Alaskan location (Husky Oil, NPR Operations,
Inc. v NLRB, 669 F2d 643 (10th Cir 1982)), or where access was refused in a town wholly
owned and controlled by the refusing company (NLRB v Stowe Spinning Co., 336 US 226
(1949)).
The Union has the (heavy) burden of showing inaccessibility. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at
847 citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436
US 180 at 205 (1978).
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ees' Section 7 rights.2 5 The test required the Board to weigh (1) the
strength of the employees' Section 7 rights against (2) the strength
of the employer's property rights, taking into account (3) the avail-
ability of other reasonably effective means of communication. 2 Be-
cause the balancing test was required in all cases, involving em-
ployee and nonemployee activity alike, it was completely at odds
with the Supreme Court's holding in Babcock.27 Therefore, the
Court dismissed the test and the Board's conclusions below and
began its analysis of Lechmere under Babcock's teaching.28
Emphasizing the narrowness of the exception to the rule in Bab-
cock, the Court held it inapplicable to the present case because
Lechmere employees were accessible by other means of communi-
cation.2 9 The Court added that communication which is burden-
some or likely to produce less than ideal results does not result in
employees being classified as inaccessible.30 Because the employees
here did not reside on Lechmere property, they were presump-
tively accessible. 1 Furthermore, their ability to be reached was
shown by the Union itself as it contacted about twenty percent of
the employees by direct contact such as telephone, mail and home
visits. 32 The Court indicated that media advertising and sign dis-
playing were also means of communication available to the Union
although it did not pass on the question of whether such methods
were ineffective due to their expense and questionable reach.33 The
Court thus concluded that Lechmere did not commit an unfair la-
bor practice by barring the nonemployee organizers from its park-
ing lot.34
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined by Justice Black-
mun, argued that Babcock, while permitting access to employers'
properties when employees were otherwise inaccessible, did not
limit access to that circumstance only.3 5 He also stated that Bab-
cock did not direct the NLRB to ignore important differences be-
tween that case and the present one, such as the private character
25. Jean Country, 291 NLRB 11 (1988). See note 71 and accompanying text.
26. Jean Country, 291 NLRB at 14.
27. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 848.
28. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 849.
29. Id.
30. Id. See note 24.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id at 849-50.
34. Id at 850.
35. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 851.
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of the parking lot in Babcock versus the public nature of the lot in
Lechmere, and the fact that employees lived in a small nearby
town in the former while those in the latter were scattered
throughout a large metropolitan area.3 Moreover, Babcock, he
urged, required that communication, not mere notice, was neces-
sary for employees to fully realize their Section 7 rights.3 7
Secondly, White argued that Babcock and the cases following it
did not purport to fix a strict rule with narrow exceptions but
rather, a flexible, accommodating rule.38  He emphasized the
Court's interpretation of Babcock in Hudgens v NLRB,39 where it
was stated that an accommodation of Section 7 rights and private
property rights was needed with respect to the nature and
strengths of the rights.
40
Thirdly, Justice White complained that Babcock itself infringed
upon the NLRB's administration of the NLRA.41 In reviewing an
agency's construction of a statute, he said, the courts must defer to
the agency if the agency's construction was a permissible one
under the statute.42 Justice White noted that, in Babcock, not only
did the Court fail to defer, but it also took over in the Board's
place by stating the "proper" construction and then applying it to
the facts. 3 Finally, he criticized the Court for applying Babcock to
the present facts, a job which has been delegated by Congress to
the NLRB.
4 4
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed with
White with respect to the Court's present interpretation of Bab-
cock, but disagreed with him to the extent that he suggested that
the Babcock decision was improper. 5
Neither the language of the NLRA nor its legislative history lend
insight into the role of nonemployee union organizers with regard
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Justice White also referred to the Court's "accommodation" language in Cen-
tral Hardware Co. v NLRB, 407 US 539, 92 S Ct 2238 (1972) and added that both Central
Hardware and Hudgens are more consistent with Jean Country than with the present hold-
ing. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 851-52.
39. 424 US 507 (1976).
40. Id.
41. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 852.
42. Id.
43. Id at 852-53.
44. Id at 853. Justice White stated that by not addressing this issue when it passed
the NLRA, Congress delegated to the Board authority to construe the statute and the courts
should not interpose. Id.
45. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 854.
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to the Section 7 rights of employees and private property rights of
employers; therefore, the NLRB and the courts were forced to ana-
lyze the interests in the still leading case of NLRB v Babcock &
Wilcox Co.4" There, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he
refuses access to company property to nonemployee union or-
ganizers who wish to distribute literature to his employees.'
7
In Babcock, the employer's property consisted of a manufactur-
ing plant, its parking lot and a 100-yard driveway joining the park-
ing lot and the highway.'8 At this intersection was a public right-
of-way, but due to the dangerous traffic conditions there, the
NLRB decided it was unsafe for the union to distribute leaflets
from it and ordered the employer to permit distribution in its
parking lot.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement
stating that the NLRA gives no rights to nonemployees to use an
employer's property to encourage unionization among employees.6 0
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employer may not
be compelled to admit nonemployee organizers on his property un-
less employees, due to the location of the plant and their living
quarters, are otherwise unreachable. 1 That the union could have
reached and did reach some Babcock employees by way of mail-
ings, phone calls and personal contacts, either in homes or on the
streets of a nearby town, 2 proved that other means of communica-
tion were reasonably available to the union.5
3
In more than three decades after the Babcock decision, the Su-
preme Court was not called upon to apply its holding. The Court
did, however, describe it in several cases in which the Babcock is-
sue was a subsidiary one."'
In 1972, the Court announced Central Hardware Co. v NLRB 55,
in which nonemployee union organizers who were banned from the
46. 351 US 105 (1956).
47. Babcock, 351 US at 106.
48. Id at 106-7.
49. Id at 107-8.
50. NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F2d 316,'319 (5th Cir 1955).
51. Babcock, 351 US at 112-13. The Court emphasized the distinction between em-
ployee and nonemployee conduct. Employees have an unrestricted right to discuss self-or-
ganization among themselves (except to the extent that it interferes with production or dis-
cipline) while nonemployees enjoy no such right. Id at 113.
52. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 NLRB 485, 492-93 (1954).
53. Babcock, 351 US at 113.
54. Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 846.
55. 407 US 539 (1972).
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retail company's parking lot filed an unfair labor practice charge
which was upheld by the Board on the ground that such activity
was protected by the First Amendment." The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit agreed, 7 but the Supreme Court remanded to
the appellate court for consideration of the case under the control-
ling Babcock decision, holding that constitutional issues, except in
very rare situations, are inapplicable in Section 7 cases."
The Court, in dictum, stated that a Babcock analysis is proper
only after the nonemployee first shows the requisite need for ac-
cess to the employer's property, i.e. that employees are inaccessi-
ble elsewhere. After need is shown, private property rights must
yield to or accommodate employees' organizational rights under
Section 7.60
The Court again had occasion to comment on its Babcock analy-
sis when, in 1976, it decided Hudgens v NLRB. 1 In Hudgens, em-
ployees of a shoe warehouse were picketing the retail shoe stores in
shopping malls.2 The general manager of one mall threatened
them with arrest if they did not depart, and, thereafter, the union
filed an unfair labor practice charge. 3 The central issue in the case
was whether the rights of the parties must be determined under
56. Central Hardware, 407 US at 542. The Board made its decision based on Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union v Logan Valley Plaza, 391 US 308 (1968). There, nonem-
ployees picketed a supermarket because its employees were nonunion. Logan, 391 US at
311. The supermarket and the parking lot owner got an injunction against the union on the
ground of trespass. Id at 312. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, but the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shopping plaza is essentially a business
district and the fact that it is privately owned rather than state-owned does not prevent the
application of the First and Fourteenth Amendment protections of freedom of speech. Lo-
gan, 391 US at 319. Although never expressly overruled, Logan's authority has been seri-
ously undermined in Lloyd Corp. v Tanner, 107 US 551 (1972) and Hudgens v NLRB, 424
US 507 (1976).
57. Central Hardware, 407 US at 542.
58. Central Hardware, 407 US at 545. Although not a labor law case, Marsh v Ala-
bama, 326 US 501 (1946), illustrates an extreme situation where one's First Amendment
rights take precedence over another's private property rights. In Marsh, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for trespassing in a company-owned town.
326 US at 510. The Court reasoned that the town could not be distinguished from any other
town except for the fact that title to the property lay in a private corporation. Id at 503.
Because the corporation opened up its property to the public for their use as a complete
town (it contained streets, sidewalks, a business district, a post office and a sewage system),
it may not deny statutory and constitutional rights to the town's users. Id at 506.
59. Central Hardware, 407 US at 545.
60. Id.
61. 424 US 507 (1976).
62. Id at 509.
63. Id.
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the NLRA, the First Amendment, or a combination of the two.4 In
holding that the NLRA exclusively controls,65 the Court described
Babcock as requiring an accommodation between employees' Sec-
tion 7 rights and employers' private property rights.6 6 The place of
that accommodation can fall at differing points along the "spec-
trum", depending on the nature and strengths of the rights."
Two years later in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v San Diego County
District Council of Carpenters," the Supreme Court, while dis-
cussing the circumstances in which the NLRA (Section 7) pre-
empts state trespass laws, reiterated Babcock's rule that an em-
ployer may bar nonemployee union organizers from his property
unless the union shows that there are no other reasonable means of
reaching the employees with the union's message. The Court
added that the union's burden is a heavy one and that organiza-
tional trespass has rarely been sustained.70
The NLRB has recently passed on the Babcock issue in its Jean
Country decision.7 1 Jean Country was a specialty store in an open-
air mall housing two major department stores and one hundred
four smaller stores.7 2 When a nonemployee union organizer ap-
proached Jean Country's employees during business hours, he was
asked to leave by the store's assistant manager, who stated that
the store was nonunion.7 3 The organizer then informed the mall's
general manager of his intent to begin an "educational" picket line
in front of the store.7 4 Subsequently, one to two pickets walked in
front of the store carrying signs for less than one hour before being
threatened with arrest.7 15 The Union then filed unfair labor practice
charges.7 6 The Administrative Law Judge held that, under Bab-
cock, if the objectives of the picketing were organizational or recog-
nitional, they could not be upheld because reasonable alternative
means of communicating with Jean Country's employees were
64. Hudgens, 424 US at 512.
65. Id at 521.
66. Id at 522.
67. Id.
68. 436 US 180 (1978).
69. Id at 205.
70. Id.
71. Jean Country, 291 NLRB 11 (1988).
72. Id at 14.






available." If the objectives were to encourage compliance with
area standards, the intended audience being Jean Country custom-
ers, the picketing must be sustained as there were no reasonable
alternative means. 8 Finding the Union's picketing to be organiza-
tional, the judge dismissed the complaint."'
The Board, concluding that the judge did not perform the ap-
propriate accommodation analysis required by Babcock, ordered,
inter alia, that Jean Country and the shopping mall allow the pick-
eting to take place.80
In its own analysis, the Board first dismissed the test which had
been in use since announced in Fairmont Hotel.81 It was decided in
Fairmont Hotel that in all cases the strength of the Section 7 right
would be weighed against the strength of the private property
right.82 The stronger right would then prevail, either admitting ac-
cess or denying it.83 Only if the rights were found to be of equal
strength would the existence or nonexistence of reasonable alterna-
tive means of communication be determinative.84 In reexamining
the Fairmont test in light of the Supreme Court's Babcock and
Hudgens decisions, the Board overruled Fairmont to the extent
that it does not require consideration of alternative means in all
cases.
85
The Board then announced the new test: in all access cases, the
Board is to balance the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right
if access should be denied against the degree of impairment of the
private property right if access would be granted, in every case tak-
ing into account the availability of reasonable alternative means.88
The Board then exemplified the test with Jean's Country's
facts. 7 It first examined the strength of the private property right
of Jean Country and the mall.8 8 Citing the commercial and public
nature of the mall," the Board concluded its private property in-
77. Id at 16.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id at 19.
81. Id at 11, citing Fairmont Hotel, 282 NLRB 139 (1986).
82. Fairmont Hotel, 282 NLRB at 142.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Jean Country, 291 NLRB at 11 n 2.
86. Id at 14.
87. Id at 16.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Board specifically noted the long hours the mall is open to the public, the




Next, the strength of the Union's Section 7 rights was ex-
amined.91 Agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge's conclu-
sion that the picketing was for organizational and recognitional
purposes, the Board found the picketing lawful.2 The strength of
the right, however, was found to be "not on the stronger end of the
'spectrum' of Section 7 rights," but still worthy of protection. 3
Turning to the availability of alternative means of communica-
tion, the Board held that although the objectives of the picketing
were organizational and recognitional, the intended audience of the
picketing was Jean Country's potential customers.94 The issue then
became whether there were other nontrespassory means by which
the union could communicate its message.9 5 The nearest public
property being one quarter mile away from the Jean Country store,
the Board held that the effectiveness of communication there
would be substantially diluted and could also unintentionally in-
volve neutral stores in the labor dispute.9 6 Thus, no reasonable al-
ternative methods were available to the Union.
97
In sum, the private property interest, being relatively weak,
would not be substantially impaired if access were granted, but the
Section 7 right would be inhibited if access were denied, consider-
ing the lack of reasonable alternative means of communication. 8
Accordingly, the Board concluded a violation of the National La-
bor Relations Act had occurred. 99
Lechmere is the first case since Babcock in which the Supreme
Court has directly addressed the issue of nonemployees using an
employer's property to facilitate employee interest in organization.
The Court chose to reexamine the issue because, in light of Jean
Country, it became apparent to the Court that the NLRB misun-
derstood Babcock."' The Lechmere Court reaffirmed and further
explained Babcock leaving no question as to the lack of protection
and from the mall, and the annual events permitted to be held on mall property. Id.
90. Jean Country, 291 NLRB at 17.
91. Id.
92. Id.




97. Id at 19.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 848.
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Section 7 affords nonemployees.
The Court reiterated that in cases of employee self-organization,
the employees' Section 7 rights should be balanced against the em-
ployer's right to control the use of his property. 10 1 However, in
cases of nonemployee activity, no balancing is permitted.0 2 Sec-
tion 7 does not protect nonemployees except where employees, by
reason of their employment location and living quarters are other-
wise inaccessible. 10 3 Only after inaccessibility is shown, does Sec-
tion 7 encompass nonemployees because the employees' right to
organize is dependent to some extent on them.' Therefore, the
Court was completely justified in holding that the facts in Lech-
mere could not be squeezed into the narrow exception of Babcock,
as Lechmere employees were accessible (indeed, many were ac-
cessed) by the traditional methods of mailings, phone contacts,
home visits and advertised meetings.0 5 The Union had the burden
of showing that the employees were inaccessible by other means, a
burden it could not possibly meet since it actually reached 20.4
percent of Lechmere employees.' 016
Although the NLRB in administering the NLRA is entitled to
judicial deference when it adapts prior decisions in response to
changes in industrial life,'0 7 the test it set forth in Jean Country
must be dismissed as it requires a balancing in all cases, thus
equating employees' organizational rights with those of nonem-
ployees. In formulating the Jean Country test, the Board relied
too heavily on Hudgens' dictum rather than on the controlling
Babcock. The Board concluded that Hudgens'"'spectrum" of rights
demanded that a balancing of the strengths of those rights be per-
formed in all cases and that sometimes employee rights would
need to be accommodated by employers.0 8 This accommodation,
however, says Babcock, only need take place when employees are
inaccessible off the employer's property.
10 9
The Lechmere Court has finally put to rest any doubt the NLRB
may have had concerning the rights of nonemployee union or-
ganizers to trespass. Simply put, they have none unless employee
101. Id, citing Babcock, 351 US at 109-10.
102. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 848.
103. Id.
104. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 845, citing Babcock, 351 US at 113.
105. Lechmere, Inc., 112 S Ct at 849.
106. Lechmere, Inc., 914 F2d 313 at 327 (Torruella dissenting).
107. Lechmere, Inc., 914 F2d at 318.




Section 7 rights will be destroyed without giving some access to
nonemployees. The narrowness of this exception is clear; there can
be no borderline cases, as the Lechmere decision took away any
subjectivity on the part of the Board. The only issue the Court
refused to address was whether costly advertising is a reasonably
effective alternative means of communication. However, consider-
ing the exception and the factual circumstances in which it has
been invoked, the concern is moot. Only when employees are iso-
lated from the normal flow of communication will an employer be
forced to admit nonemployees on his property. The cases which
have allowed such access typically involved employees who lived
on their employer's property and could not be reached elsewhere.
In other employment situations, advertising will rarely, if ever, be
the sole alternate method available because license plate number
recording (leading to employee names and addresses) and direct
contacts off of the employer's property will be less expensive
means.
That the Court decided correctly is evident not only from the
precedent of Babcock, but also from the language of the NLRA
itself. Section 7 gives organizational rights to employees only. Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) forbids employer interference or restraint against em-
ployees who attempt to exercise those rights. An employer has
every right to maintain his property and to restrict or deny the
admission of those uninvited. Furthermore, though Section 8(a)(1)
forbids employer interference, it does not require employers to as-
sist labor organizations in forming.
Babcock taught that in determining whether a trespass is per-
missible, the Board must look to the availability of reasonably ef-
fective alternative means of communication. "Reasonably effec-
tive" means are other methods of communication likely to make
the intended audience aware of the Union's effort. It does not
mean the most effective means, which would always be personal
contact with employees at the job site. Also, the emphasis is on the
availability of reasonably effective means. This should not be con-
fused with unreceptiveness on the part of employees. In Lechmere,
reasonably effective alternative means other than trespassing were
available to the Union. The Union used those means. It got little
response from Lechmere employees. The problem was not one of
inaccessibility; it was one of disinterest.
The Lechmere view, a 6-3 majority, is likely to remain un-
changed. It solidified the long-standing Babcock rule, which was a
Vol. 31:195
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unanimous decision by eight Supreme Court Justices. 1 0 Lechmere
has given the National Labor Relations Board its firm direction on
organizational trespass.
Rebecca Mastrangelo
110. Babcock, 351 US at 105.
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